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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15525 
DENNIS BLAINE ANGUS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with aggravated assault in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1975). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury on October S, 
1977, in the District Court of Utah County, the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorenson, presiding. The jury returned a verdict 
of guilty and the appellant was sentenced to a term not to 
exceed five years on the aggravated assault charge~ because 
a firearm was used in the crime the court invoked the 
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (Supp. 1977), and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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imposed an additional sentence not to exceed five 
years, to run consecutively with the first. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the verdict 
and of the judgments of the court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 20, 1977, Clyde Davies was driving a 
truck southbound on I-15 near Santaquin, Utah, when a bullet 
pierced the door on the driver's side and struck his leg 
(T.9-11). He saw a highway patrol car about 60 yards away, 
stopped on the northbound berm; so Davies drove his truck to 
a spot opposite, where he pulled over and stopped. He then 
walked across the lanes of traffic to the patrol car, where 
he told Officer Mike Royce of the incident (T.17). 
At about the same time Kent Child had a bullet 
strike the door of his vehicle, and as he turned in the 
direction of the shot, he saw a white van northbound (T.22). 
Dan Davidson testified that as he drove southbound on I-15, 
he heard a loud noise, like a tire blowing out, and observed 
a cream-colored van passing northbound on the interestate, 
adding that he saw no other traffic northbound in the 
immediate vicinity (T.36). 
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Mr. Child turned around, parked his car near the 
patrol car, and told Officer Royce about the white van (T.25). 
While Officer Royce took Mr. Davies to the hospital, Officers 
Sparks and Bradford received information about the suspect 
van and headed northbound in pursuit, stopping the appellant 
within five minutes of the shooting report (T.81), in his 
white van on the Payson off-ramp (T.41). In court, Officer 
Bradford identified appellant as the driver of the van (T.42). 
The two officers ordered appellant from the van and 
Officer Bradford proceeded to search him (T.42). During the 
body search, appellant asked what the problem was and Officer 
Bradford told him he was in a suspect vehicle and that he 
would like to look in the van. Officer Bradford testified 
that appellant then said: "Go ahead. I will tell you anything 
you want to know or tell you where anything is if you want to 
know." (T.43). Appellant also reportedly told the officer 
that a .22 rifle and a .22 pistol were in there (T.43). 
Officer Bradford entered the van and found a number 
of empty .22 shells in the driver's seat, a box half-full of 
ammunition on the console and more eMpty shells throughout 
the van. Just behind the passenger seat was a loaded .22 rifle 
and against the rear doors was a .22 partially loaded pistol 
(T.44). 
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Officer Royce thereafter found a spent casing in 
the northbound lanes near the Santaquin overpass (T.87), 
Ballistics expert James Gaskill testified that 
all of the recovered casings were fired from appellant's 
.22 pistol, except for one fired from the rifle (T.105-107), 
He reached no conclusions about the origin of the bullet 
fragments taken from Mr. Davies' leg (T.106). 
Appellant testified that he was "half-drunk" that 
evening and if he shot his weapons on the highway it would 
not have been intentional. Earlier that day he had been 
test-firing his guns (T.126). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS CONDUCTEC, 
PURSUANT TO APPELLANT'S CONSENT; THEREFORE, EVIDENCE OBTAINEC 
DURING THE SEARCH WAS ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL. 
The circumstances of the search of appellant's 
vehicle demonstrate convincingly that appellant voluntarily 
consented to the search of his van by Officer Bradford. 
Pertinent testimony is documented at T.43, during the direct 
examination of the officer, after earlier questioning had 
established that Officer Bradford parked his vehicle behind 
appellant's van, ordered appellant out of his vehicle, and 
approached and searched appellant: 
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"A. When I was searching 
him he asked me what was going 
on. I told him he was in a 
suspect vehicle; that we would 
like to look in his van. He 
said, 'Go ahead. I will tell 
you anything you want to know 
or tell you where anything is if 
you want to know.' 
Q. Did he tell you what 
was in the van? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said, 'There is a 
.22 rifle in there and there is 
a pistol, .22 pistol.' 
Q. Did you in fact look 
into the van? 
A. Yes, I did." 
Officer Bradford then continued to describe 
the weapons and ammunition found inside the van. It must 
be emphasized that no objections to any of this testimony 
were made at trial nor does the record indicate any 
motion to suppress the evidence by defense counsel prior 
to trial. Thus, respondent contends that by failing to 
raise such objections or motions to the admission of 
the evidence found during the search, appellant waived 
the right to raise such objections now on appeal. 
Nevertheless, the record--in particular Officer 
Bradford's testimony--provides no support for appellant's 
claim that he merely consented to the authority of the 
police to search and did not personally authorize the 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
search. Respondent submits that Bumper v. North Carolina, 
391 U.S. 543 (1968), relied upon by appellant, is easily 
distinguished for in Bumper the Court held no genuine 
consent to a search can be given where the basis for 
the consent is an assertion by a law enforcement officer 
that he has a search warrant; therefore, the lawfulness 
of the search cannot be justified on the basis that the 
occupant consented. 
Because appellant's consent was actual and not 
coerced in any manner by the investigating officers, the 
fruits of that search were properly admitted into evidence 
at trial. 
B. AN ADDITIONAL BASIS FOR THE SEARCH WAS 
PROVIDED BY THE PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP THE VAN IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH EXCEPTION 
ALLOWED FOR MOVING VEHICLES. 
Officer Royce testified (T.76) that after he 
escorted Mr. Davies to the patrol car, he waved Officer 
Sparks northbound, anticipating the direction the suspect 
vehicle had gone, based on an earlier report which had 
alerted him of another incident. The information provided 
by Mr. Child described the suspect vehicle as a northbound 
white van (T.40), one that Officer Sparks had observed 
just prior to Mr. Davies' report. The traffic that 
-6-
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evening was light, and appellant's van was the only white 
one in the vicinity (T.40). Approximately four minutes 
after the radio report to intercept a white van, Officer 
Sparks and Bradford made contact with the van, followed 
it for two miles (T.41), and pulled the van over on the 
Payson off-ramp (T.77). 
Even without appellant's consent, respondent 
submits that the officer's search of the van and seizure 
of the weapons and ammunition was a valid search and 
seizure based on probable cause and justified by the 
exigent circumstances presented by a moving vehicle. 
The probable cause was established by the 
particular enumerated facts--the description, the timing, 
the traffic light--which led police officers reasonably 
to believe that the shots had been fired from appellant's 
white van. The situation was critical; an unidentified 
driver of a white van had been taking pot-shots at 
passing vehicles, seriously endangering lives. All 
indications were that the shots had originated in appel-
lant 1 s van. To merely discuss the situation with appellant 
was insufficient and to release the vehicle and driver 
without a search unthinkable, as the high risk of 
further injury to other innocent travelers would not 
have been decreased if weapons remained in the van. 
1 
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This Court discussed the tension between the 
right of a citizen to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental interference and the need of law enforcement 
officers to perform their tasks conscientiously in State 
v. Criscola, 444 P.2d 517 (Utah 1968), at p. 517: 
" ••• But it is equally 
important that such protections 
do not become so extended beyond 
their reasons for being that even 
when there is no danger or likeli-
hood of any such abuse, they provide 
a cloak of protection by which those 
engaged in criminal activities may 
escape detection and punishment. 
The essential thing is to keep 
within the reasonable middle ground, 
between the protecting of the law-
abiding citizen from high-handed 
or officious intrusions into their 
private affairs; and the imposing of 
undue restrictions upon conscientious 
officers doing their duty in the 
investigation of crime." 
On this basis, given the officer's probable cause, 
a search of the van was necessary. Under Carroll v. United 1 
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42 (1970), the on-the-scene warrantless search which 
ensued was legal: 
"The measure of legality of 
such a seizure is, therefore, that 
the seizing officer shall have 
reasonable or probable cause for 
believing that the automobile which 
he stops and seizes has contraband 
liquor therein which is being 
illegally transported." 267 u.s 
at 155-156. 
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In the instant case, the suspected contraband was a loaded 
weapon, but the rationale is the same; as the Carroll Court 
noted, the search of an automobile on probable cause proceeds 
on a theory wholly different from that justifying a search 
incident to an arrest for: 
" ••• [t)he right to search and 
the validity of the seizure are not 
dependent on the right to arrest. 
They are dependent on the reasonable 
cause the seizing officer has that 
the contents of the automobile 
offend against the law." 267 U.S. 
at 158-159. 
It is well settled that once probable cause is 
established to search a vehicle stopped on the highway, a 
search warrant is unnecessary. The Carroll Court observed 
that the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and 
the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant 
must be obtained. Seeing no difference between seizing 
and holding a vehicle for a warrant and searching the 
vehicle on the spot, the Court decided that given 
probable cause, either course is reasonable. 
The Chambers' decision reinforced the Carroll 
principles, observing that the opportunity to search is 
fleeting since a car is readily movable. At 90 s.ct. 1981, 
Footnote 9, the Court remarked: 
-9-
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•. [f]ollowing the car 
until a warrant can be obtained 
seems an impractical alternative 
since, among other things, the 
car may be taken out of the 
jurisdiction. Tracing the car 
and searching it hours or days 
later would of course permit the 
instruments or fruits of crime to 
be removed from the car before the 
search." 
Under this analysis, the highway patrol officers 
had a right--if not a duty--to search the suspect van 
for weapons, even if this Court were to find appellant's 
consent to the search defective. 
Since the plain view doctrine might also justify 
this search (T.43), respondent urges that on any of these 
three bases, this Court find the warrantless search valid 
and the fruits therefrom admissible. 
POINT II 
THE ENHANCEMENT PROVISION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-3-203 (SUPP. 1977), DOES NOT IMPOSE A DOUBLE 
PUNISHMENT FORBIDDEN BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Pertinent portions of Section 76-3-203 provide: 
"A person who has been convicted 
of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
* * * (3) In the case of a felony of the 
third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds 
a firearms or a facsimile or the repre-
sentation of a firearm was used in the 
-10-
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commission or furtherance of the 
felony, the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently." 
This statute grants the court the discretionary 
power to impose on a felon a longer sentence if he used 
a firearm during the commission of a crime. In Utah and 
numerous other states having such a provision, the statute 
was the response of a legislature concerned with the 
dramatic increase in violent crimes and especially in the 
use of firearms to commit those crimes, greatly increasing 
the risk of injury or death to the victims. Respondent 
contends that an enhancement provision is not a double 
punishment; it is rather a punishment increased by the 
court when a firearm is used, adopted both as a method 
of deterring criminals from using these most deadly 
weapons and of punishing them more severely than others 
who commit the same crimes without using a firearm. 
The cases cited by appellant on this point are 
readily distinguished. Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 
21 L.Ed. 872 (1874), was a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, in which the petitioner complained that 
although he was convicted under an embezzlement statute 
which provided for imprisonment or fine as a punishment, 
he was both sentenced to prison and ordered to pay a fine. 
-11-
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The Court found this an illegal double punishment, in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which states that "no person shall for 
the same offense be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb ••• " 
United States v. Elwell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966), 
also mentions the Double Jeopardy clause in a case 
concerning narcotics convictions and retrials after 
reversals. The Court found that clause designed to 
prohibit double jeopardy as well as double punishment 
and "is not properly invoked unless the 'same offense' 
is involved in both the first and second trials." Id. 
at 124. The instant case simply does not involve two 
trials for one offense, but a lengthened sentence for 
using a firearm during one crime. 
The third case relied upon by appellant also 
involved a retrial after the reversal of the first 
conviction. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 
(1969), the Court held that while the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is violated when punishment already exacted for 
an offense is not fully credited in imposing a new 
sentence after retrial on the same offense, the clause 
does not restrict the length of sentence upon reconviction; 
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and a more severe sentence may legally be imposed. Once 
again, it is the dissimilarities to the instant 
case which are noteworthy--not the similarities--which 
are limited to both cases being criminal, rather than 
civil. 
Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 21 L.Ed. 872 
(1874), provided considerable historial analysis 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause in observing the clear 
intent of the framers to be that in the area of double 
punishment that a man not be subject to a second punish-
ment for the same offense for which he has already 
served a separate punishment. Since appellant was 
sentenced to only one punishment, admittedly made 
more severe because a firearm was used, respondent 
submits that no violation of the double punishment 
prohibition occurred. 
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POINT III 
APPELLAN'l' HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE UTAH 
ENHANCEMENT STATUTE; THEREFORE ITS INVOCATION BY 'l'HE TRIAL 
JUDGE WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS. 
Appellant complains that he was never specifically 
informed of the existence of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 
1977),or of its possible application in his case, claiming 
that he may have plea bargained his way to a lesser penalty 
or a lesser crime. Not only is such mere speculation in-
appropriate here, but also a mistake of law is generally no 
defense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304 (Supp. 1977), provides in 
pertinent part that:"(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning t~ 
' I 
existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime.,\ 
I 
I 
A few limited exceptions, inapplicable under these facts, au 
then provided. Therefore, appellant and his attorney were 
on constructive notice of the statute's existence and a br~f 
perusal of the Sentencing provisions of the Code would have 
easily detected the enhancement statute. Therefore, appellan:, 
who used a firearm during his crime, was on notice that if 
convicted, § 76-3-203 might be applied. 
By its language the enhancement statute is per-
missive, not mandatory. Consequently, its application is 
left to the discretion of the court, although it can act on~ 
-14-
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if a finding of firearm use has been made by the trier 
of fact. That is, of course, not determined until the 
verdict is returned; so the court's deliberative process 
begins after the conviction with a weighing of the facts 
of the case which support imposition of the more severe 
penalty and any mitigating facts which suggest that the 
judicial discretion not to invoke the enhancement statute 
ought to be exercised. 
Therefore, there should have been no suprises at 
sentencing when Judge Allen B. Sorenson announced his inten-
tion to invoke the enhancement statute and tack onto appellant's 
initial 0-5 year sentence an additional 0-5 years, to run con-
secutively, for using a firearm to commit the aggravated 
assault. Respondent asserts that any actual surprise resulted 
from appellant's own negligence in failing to study sentencing 
options and provisions under the Utah Code before deciding to 
plead not guilty. 
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501 (1962), 
cited by appellant, does not support his position as that case 
concerned an habitual offender statute and the notice require-
ments applicable thereto. In finding there was a denial of 
due process, the Court said at 503-504: 
"Even though an habitual criminal 
charge does not state a separate offense, 
the determination of whether one is a 
habitual criminal is essentially independent 
of the determination of guilt on the under-
lying substantive offense." 
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However, in the instant case the decision whether or not the 
enhancement provision could be invoked rested totally on the 
findings of the jury that a firearm was used in this one 
crime, a finding necessary under the facts before a guilty 
verdict could be returned. Respo~dent, therefore, urges the 
court to find that appellant was amply accorded due process 
of the law. 
POINT IV 
THE RETURN OF A GENERAL GUILTY VERDICT IS A FIND-
ING BY IMPLICATION THAT THE DEFENDANT USED A FIREARM, WHERE 
THE INFORMATION ALLEGED THAT THE DEFENDANT USED A FIREARM 
IN AN ATTEMPT TO DO BODILY INJURY. 
The information against appellant excerpted below I 
and made part of the Appendix, clearly shows that he was charcj 
with using a firearm to commit an assault: 
" ... charges that ... Dennis Blaine 
Angus assaulted Clyde Davies by attempting, 
with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to the said Clyde Davies by 
use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm." 
All of the state's evidence at trial concerned ~oor 
ing reports, bullet holes in vehicles and in a person, retrie': 
of guns, ammunition, and bullet casings, and ballistic report;, 
linking bullets with guns found in appellant's van. The on~ 
aggravated assault at issue was the one alleged to have been 
-16-
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committed by appellant by taking pot-shots at a passing 
vehicle. Instructions Four and Five, attached hereto as 
part of the Appendix, informed the jury of the elements of 
the charge with such specificity that a not guilty verdict 
was mandatory unless the jury found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that appellant had used a firearm as the deadly weapon. 
Although it is true that the jury did not return a 
special finding to that effect, the return of the guilty 
verdict was a finding by implication that appellant had com-
mitted the crime as charged; and that finding provided the 
basis for the court's invocation of the enhancement provision 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1977). 
State v. Aberigo, 109 Ariz. 294, 508 P.2d 1156 (1973), 
supports this rationale and cited approvingly State v. Tosatto, 
107 Ariz. 231, 485 P.2d 556 (1971). In the latter case the 
appellant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. The 
Arizona enhancement provision was invoked even though there 
had been no jury finding of use of a gun. Commenting that 
the evidence clearly showed that the defendant had pointed 
a pistol at the victim, firing it so it barely missed her head, 
the court held that "all that is necessary [to invoke an 
enhanced punishment] is that the evidence presented clearly 
indicates that the assault was committed by means of a gun." 
485 P.2d 560. 
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While the Arizona case is directly on point, the 
California case cited by appellant is not. The facts of 
People v. Najera, 8 C.A. 3rd 504, 503 P.2d 1353 (1972), are 
considerably different. That defendant was charged with 
robbery and with being armed with a deadly weapon. The pro-
secution failed to request jury instruction on the ~ of a 
firearm under Section 12022.5 of the California Penal Code. 
The Court noted that an identical situation had arisen in 
People v. Spencer, 22 Cal. App. 3d 786, 99 Cal Rptr. 681, 691 I 
(1972), where the Second District Court of Appeals had deni~ 
the People's request that the cause "be remanded to permit 
the People the opportunity to try to a jury the allegation 
that appellant 'used' a firearm within the meaning of Penal 
Code Section 12022.5." Approvingly citing Spencer at lengti, 
the California Supreme Court in Najera held that the People 
waived the application of Section 12022.5 by failing to ask 
for instructions on use of a weapon, as a jury's findings 
that a defendant is armed is not equivalent to a finding that 
a defendant used his weapon. 
As the Najera case is not analogous to the instant 
case, respondent urges this Court to adopt the Arizona view 
that the court may invoke the enchanced punishment provision 
when the evidence clearly indicates that the convicted 
defendant used a firearm during the crime. 
-18-
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POINT V 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203 (SUPP. 1977~ IS A 
SENTENCING PROVISION ONLY AND DOES NOT CREATE A NEW OFFENSE. 
The Utah Legislature inserted the enchancement 
statute in the Punishments chapter of the Utah Code. Although 
appellant suggests that the legislature probably intended to 
create a new offense, respondent submits that placement in 
the Punishments chapter was more than fortuitous and that 
had a new offense been intended it would logically have been 
placed in one of the several Offenses chapters, especially 
Offenses Against the Person. Significantly, the legislature 
elected to place the enhancement statute in the Sentencing 
section of the Punishments chapter, indicating a clear intent 
that it be a sentencing provision only, not a new offense. 
Numerous other states have considered this issue and 
have determined that no new crime is created. Among neighbor-
ing states so finding: Nevada [Raby v. Nevada, 574 P.2d 895 
(1976)], California [People v. White, 129 Cal.Rptr. 769, 549 
P.2d 537 (1946)], and New Mexico [State v. Barreras, 88 N.Mex 
52, 536 P. 2d ll08 (1975)]. 
Respondent acknowledges that the federal enchanced 
punishment provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) has been construed 
as creating a separate offense that must be separately charged. 
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However, the language of the federal statute is dissimilar 
to the Utah statute,,and courts finding that a separate 
federal offense was created have relied heavily on the 
legislative history and wording of the Act. 
For convenience of comparison, the United States 
and Utah statutes are set out below: 
" (c) Vi'hoever--
(1) uses a firearm to commit any 
felony for which he may be prosecuted 
in a court of the United States, or 
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully 
during the commission of any felony 
for which he may be prosecuted in a 
court of the United States, shall in 
addition to the punishment provided 
for the commission of such felony, 
be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment for not less than one year nor 
more than ten years. In the case of 
his second or subsequent conviction 
under this subsection, such person 
shall be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for not less than two 
nor more than twenty-five years and, 
notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, the court shall not suspend 
the sentence in the case of a second 
or subsequent conviction of such 
person or give him a probationary 
sentence, nor shall the term of 
imprisonment imposed under this sub-
section run concurrently with any 
term of imprisonment imposed for the 
commission of such felony." 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924 (c) (emphasis added). 
"Felony conviction--Indeterminate 
term of imprisonment--Increase of 
sentence if firearm used.--A person 
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who has been convicted of a felony 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of 
the first degree, for a ter~ at not 
less than five years and which may be 
for life but if the trier of fact finds 
a firearm or a facsimile or the repre-
sentation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, 
the court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not con-
currently; and the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not con-
currently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of 
the second degree. 
(3) In the case of a felony of 
the third degree. 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment for a felony in 
which a firearm was used or involved in the 
accomplishment of the felony and is con-
victed of another felony when a firearm 
was used or involved in the accomplishment 
of the felony shall, in addition to any 
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for 
an indeterminate term to be not less than 
five nor more than ten years to run con-
secutively and not concurrently." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (in part). 
After a lengthy analysis of the statute's legis-
lative history, the court in United States v. Suddeth, 457 
F.2d 1198, 1201 (10th Cir. 1972), concluded that a separate 
crime had been intended by Congress and made these pertinent 
observations: 
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"If the subsection 924(c) 
is considered as a separate Act 
taken out of the context in which 
it was placed, it takes on the 
appearance of an ordinary pro-
vision defining a crime. As the 
wording is typical of such a 
definition, it is perhaps unusual 
to take such a subsection out of 
context, but we think it should 
be done because it is in fact a 
stranger where it is placed. It 
is apparent also that the language 
in the subsection making the crime 
dependent upon the proof of an-
other crime is unusual, but again 
it does not necessarily convert 
it into merely an increase in 
the penalty for the basic crime. 
This aspect does not overcome the 
other indications of the construc-
tion of the subsection as an 
independent crime. 
Perhaps the strongest single 
phrase in the subsection to in-
dicate it is a separate crime is 
the reference to '. .subsequent 
convictions under this subsection 
This, of course, is typical 
of a definition of a separate 
crime and provisions relating to 
the increase in punishment upon 
the second or third conviction 
thereof." 
While it was therefore reasonable and proper to 
hold that 18 U.S.C. §924(c) created a separate federal cri~, 
respondent submits that the language and placement of the 
Utah statute just as clearly leads to a conclusion that §76-
3-203 is a punishment provision only, which allows a court to 
impose a more severe sentence on a convicted felon who used 
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e, 
a firearm during the commission of the crime, as a recogni-
tion of the great, immediate potential for serious bodily 
harm that is unique to firearms and which set guns apart 
from knives, chains, or baseball bats. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the guns and ammunition were legally seized 
following appellant's consent to the search and/or under the 
moving vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, and Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1977),is a valid exercise of 
legislative po1~r to punish more severely persons who use 
firearms to commit felonies, respondent urges this Court to 
affirm the verdict and judgment of the court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Instruction No. 4 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah 
against the defendant i~ ~hich he is accused by the information 
of the conunission of a felony. The charging part of the 
information is as follows: 
"That on or about the 2Qth day of July A.D., 1977, at 
Utah county, State of Utah, the said Denni~ Blaine Angus 
assaulted Clyde Davies by attempting, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to the said Clyqe_Davies by use 
of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm." 
When the defendant was arraigned upon this charge he 
entered a plea of not guilty, which ?lea casts upon the State 
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the essential 
elements of the crime charged as set forth in Instruction No. 5. 
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Instruction No. 5 
The essential elements of the crime charged in the 
information are as follows: 
1. That the defendant made an aggravated assault upon 
the person of Clyde Davies. 
2. That such assault, if any, was made with a deadly 
weapon in the hand of the defendant. 
3. That such assault, if any, was made or or about 
July 20, 1977, at Utah County, Utah. 
If the evidence has failed to prove to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt any of the essential elements set 
forth above, then the defendant is not guilty of the crime 
charged. But if the evidence does prove to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the essential elements 
set forth above, then the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged. 
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